Climate Adaptation and Conflict Mitigation: The Case of South Sudan. (with Ore Koren). Series: Organizational Response to Climate Change: Businesses, Governments. Cambridge University Press. (April 2025). DOI: Link
As climate change intensifies, conflict-prone tropical regions face heightened vulnerabilities, yet little is known about how climate adaptation and food security efforts affect conflict dynamics. Using South Sudan – a country highly susceptible to climate stress and conflict – as a test case, this Element analyzes how international nongovernmental organizations' (INGO) climate adaptation interventions influence civil war and local social conflicts. It develops a theoretical framework linking climate adaptation to conflict, positing both positive and negative externalities. Drawing on original high-resolution data on INGO-driven adaptation and food security efforts, alongside climate, conflict, and development data, findings are substantiated with interviews from policy workers in South Sudan. The results indicate that while adaptation generally does not reduce conflict, interventions that promote preparedness and are implemented during periods of high climate stress can mitigate social conflicts between militias, pastoralists, and farmers. These insights provide guidance for designing climate adaptation strategies that reduce conflict risks.
“Assessing the Effects of International Sanctions on Conflict-Induced Refugee Flows” (with Naji Bsisu and Kate Vernallis). Accepted at Foreign Policy Analysis.
Recent research demonstrates that there exists significant variation in the number of refugees that civil wars generate. We believe that two types of sanctions play a nontrivial role in partly explaining this variation. We argue that imposed military sanctions have a negative impact on the flow of refugees, as these sanctions reduce warring parties’ ability and willingness to use violence against civilians to achieve their political objectives. The constraints on critical revenues caused by economic sanctions, however, increase refugee flows, as they compel targets to replenish lost income using violence and exploitation of civilian populations. Using mediation analysis, we find that each sanction type has the expected effect on refugee flows via their impact on violence against civilians.
“Economic Sanctions and the Distribution of State Capacity in Target Countries: A Disaggregated Analysis of Developing States.” International Studies Quarterly. (August 2025). DOI: Link
Do economic sanctions impact subnational state capacity within developing target states? Building on prior research, I begin with the notion that after sanctions are imposed, a target regime is compelled to alter capacity-related government spending to preserve its hold on power. However, drawing on the territorial politics literature, I contend that the reallocation of dwindling revenues is a distinct spatial phenomenon, a form of redistribution that strengthens local level administrative and coercive capacity in the geographic center of power but at the expense of targets’ reach into more peripheral regions of the state. To evaluate my theory, I employ a disaggregated analysis that combines new sanctions data with geolocated data on capital distance and subnational state capacity. Directly in line with my theory, I find that upon the imposition of economic sanctions, state capacity becomes more robust in the capital; this effect becomes less intense as capital distance increases, leading to a significant decrease in state capacity in the periphery. These findings are robust to various methodological, model, and variable specifications.
“Human Rights Organizations, Equal Opportunity, and Violence Against Refugees.” (with Naji Bsisu and Lacey Hunter). The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. (February 2025). DOI: Link
What factors influence levels of repression targeting refugee populations? In this paper, we explore the efficacy of top-down and bottom-up approaches to mitigating host-state repression, specifically highlighting the role of human rights organizations (HROs) and institutionalized equal opportunity in influencing states’ decision to violently repress refugees. In so doing, we argue that repression levels can be moderated through proper accommodation and integration of refugee populations via the activities of HROs in addition to increased institutionalized equal opportunities for displaced persons. Using a new dataset that captures state repression of refugee populations together with a zero-inflated ordered probit model and an estimation technique that addresses endogeneity, we find mixed support for our hypotheses.
“Targeted Sanctions, Resource Substitution, and Violence Against Civilians: Localized Evidence from African States.” (with Ore Koren). World Development. (July 2024). DOI: Link
Since the 1990s, the UN Security Council increased its use of targeted sanctions, yet we know very little about their unintended impact on civilian victimization, especially at the local level. This study argues that imposing sanctions on armed actors may compel them to seize non-sanctioned agricultural resources to replenish lost revenues and use violence to facilitate appropriation. A new dataset on sanctioned group violence in agricultural areas is developed by matching UN sanctions data with information on local attacks on civilians from the UCDP GED and combining these data with a new geographic dataset. Quantitative analyses establish that monthly changes in cash crop productivity affect political violence by sanctioned actors in Africa, while violence by unsanctioned and pre-sanctioned actors is unaffected. A short case study of Somalia validates the hypothesized mechanism by showing that al-Shabaab actively engaged in violence over such substitution dynamics.
“American Diasporas, Homeland Human Rights Conduct, and the Onset of Human Rights-Based Economic Sanctions.” International Interactions. 49, 5 (September 2023): 727-754. DOI: Link
Why does the US government choose to initiate human rights-based economic sanctions against some highly repressive target countries, but not others? And, under what conditions does it do so? In this paper, I posit an interactive theory wherein I argue that diaspora size moderates the relationship between target human rights conduct and the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions. I contend that as the size of a diaspora increases, its capacity to influence the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions strengthens, as it can more effectively (1) lobby decisionmakers in Congress and the White House directly as well as (2) indirectly via using contentious action to mobilize public opinion, which intensifies the pressure on Congresspersons and the President to act. To test my contention, I combine US sanctions data with data on American diasporas and homeland human rights conduct and find that while diaspora size strongly and consistently moderates the relationship between homeland human rights conduct and the onset of Congressional sanctions, its moderating impact on Presidential sanctions is inconsistent and, moreover, negligible when addressing endogeneity and other concerns.
“Bilateral Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are Donor Delivery Tactics Stimulating Economic Growth and Development?” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 37, 1 (June 2019): 128-147. DOI: Link
The literature assessing the effectiveness of bilateral foreign aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa primarily focuses on one aspect of the aid delivery mechanism that is employed by donors, namely that of channeling aid to recipient central governments. These analyses do not take into account alternative donor delivery tactics of circumventing recipient governments with poor institutional quality – delivering aid to non-state "bypass" actors instead. Thus, the objective of this paper is to extend the aid effectiveness literature by disaggregating bilateral aid flows into both government-to-government aid and bypass aid and assess their relative effect on economic growth. Utilizing data compiled from multiple data sources including the OECD Credit Reporting Services and World Bank datasets, I find that whereas the effect of government-to-government aid on economic growth is conditional on institutional quality, bypass aid is unconditionally effective.
“Economic Sanctions, State Capacity, and Rural Rebel Group Formation in Target Countries: Evidence from African States.” Under Review.
Do imposed economic sanctions increase the risk of rebel group formation in target countries? If so, where are rebel groups more likely to form? Building on prior work, I begin with the notion that after sanctions are imposed, targets reallocate dwindling revenues spatially, a form of redistribution that strengthens state capacity in the geographic center of power but at the expense of targets’ capacity in more peripheral regions of the state. I contend that, as a result, target regimes can preserve the status quo and thus forestall would-be rebels from forming in the capital and other major cities, but in the rural periphery, a decrease in spending on public goods and services together with a deteriorating capacity to detect and deter would-be insurgents increases individuals’ willingness and opportunity to rebel. Using mediation analysis and a measure of state capacity that captures the interrelationship among revenue generation, administrative, and coercive capacity, I demonstrate that sanctions’ negative impact on state capacity significantly increases the risk of rural rebel group formation but has no effect on the formation of rebel groups in major urban areas.
“Economic Sanctions and Peripheral Armed Conflict in Target Countries: Evidence from Developing States.” Preparing for submission.
Do imposed economic sanctions affect the risk of civil conflict within target countries? If so, what is the nature of this relationship? In this paper, I argue that because sanctions weaken target regimes in peripheral regions of the state, peripheral rebels are incentivized to use violence against the state to accomplish their political objectives. In response, target regimes employ a strategy of containment rather than a robust counterinsurgency approach, as sanctions-induced revenue constraints render such an approach too costly for sanctioned regimes. In the capital, however, target regimes employ a strategy of deterrence due to its high strategic importance, which discourages rebels from targeting the seat of power and reduces the risk of civil conflict therein. To evaluate my theory, I employ a disaggregated analysis that combines new sanctions data with geolocated data on capital distance and civil conflict risk and find that after sanctions are imposed, conflict risk in the capital significantly decreases; this robust negative effect weakens as capital distance increases, leading to a significant increase in the risk of armed conflict in peripheral regions of the state.
"Economic Sanctions and the Rise of Pro-Government Militias in Target Countries." In progress.
“Economic Sanctions and Civil Conflict in Target Countries.” Link
Do imposed economic sanctions increase the risk of civil conflict in target countries? If so, where is conflict more likely to occur? And why is conflict more likely to occur in these regions? To answer these questions, I begin with the notion that after sanctions are imposed, a target regime is compelled to alter capacity-related government spending to preserve its hold on power. However, drawing on the territorial politics literature, I reveal that the reallocation of dwindling revenues is a distinct spatial phenomenon, a form of redistribution that strengthens state capacity in the geographic center of power but at the expense of targets’ reach into more peripheral regions of the state. I demonstrate that, as a result, target regimes can preserve the status quo and thus forestall would-be rebels from forming in the urban core, but in the rural periphery, a decrease in spending on public goods and services together with a deteriorating capacity to detect and deter would-be insurgents increases individuals’ willingness and opportunity to rebel. Findings indicate that sanctions’ negative impact on state capacity significantly increases the risk of rural rebel group formation but has no effect on the formation of rebel groups in major urban areas. Finally, I demonstrate that because sanctions weaken target regimes in peripheral regions of the country, peripheral rebel forces are incentivized to use violence against the state to accomplish their political objectives, compelling targets employ a strategy of containment (i.e., preventing rebellions from spreading beyond the periphery) rather than a robust counterinsurgency approach, as sanctions-induced resource constraints render such an approach too costly for sanctioned regimes. In the capital, however, target regimes employ a strategy of deterrence due to its high strategic importance, which discourages rebels from targeting the seat of power and reduces the risk of civil conflict therein.
"Economic Sanctions, State Presence, and Social Conflict in Target Countries."
“Economic Sanctions, Low-Priority Spending, and Climate-Related Violence in Target Countries.”
"How Financial Sanctions Impact Cartel Governance in Mexico."